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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
V.

:
:
:
:
i

PETITION FOR REHEARING

!

:
NEAL W. FINLAYSON, individually :
and LEE CHILDSf individually
and as Guardian ad litem of
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor,

No. 860204 - CA

:

Defendant and
Appellant.

:
:

COMES NOW Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance
Company, by and through its attorneys undersigned and, pursuant
to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, moves this court
for rehearing.
This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the attached
memorandum of points of law and fact which petitioner claims the
court has overlooked or misapprehended.
The undersigned counsel for petitioner hereby certifies
that the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this

3 L M " day of March, 1988.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

V. SMITH
Attorneys for Metropolitan
Property & Liability Insurance
Company

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
The following Memorandum of Points and Authorities is
submitted

in

support

of

Metropolitan

Property

&

Liability

Insurance Company's Petition for Rehearing.
ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court of Appeals
has overlooked or misapprehended a number of issues critical to
the appeal in this matter.

The following list will itemize some

of the concerns of Metropolitan Property & Liability
Company.

Insurance

Each issue will be discussed in greater depth in the

body of the memorandum.
1.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR

CONSIDERATION WERE MANY.
This Court of Appeals indicated that:
The single issue on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly determined, on the
stipulated facts, that Finlayson's use of the
FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within
the meaning of the exclusion contained in the
policy.
If it did, the pickup would not be
considered a non-owned automobile for the
purposes of the policy and Metropolitan would
have no liability. (Opinion page 2 ) .
The issue of whether the actual use of the pickup truck
at the time of the accident was a "regular use" was one issue,
but only one.
use was not
pickup

truck

Metropolitan pointed out in its brief that actual
required
was

to invoke the exclusion.

furnished

or

available

for

Rather, if the
regular

use, the

exclusion would be invoked to exclude coverage.
There were a multitude of other
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The

policy

of

insurance,

as discussed

in the

briefs

filed with this Court, provides that there is no coverage for a
non-owned
regular

vehicle
use

of

which

either

is

"furnished

the

named

or

insured

available
or

any

for

the

relative."

Applying this Court's adopted definition of "pattern of use" to
the term

"regular

"furnished

for

or

use" it

is clear that the pickup truck was

available

for"

the

"pattern

or

prescribed

course of use" which would exclude coverage.
4.

THE POLICY ITSELF INCORPORATES A "FREQUENCY" TEST,

RATHER THAN A "PATTERN OF USE" TEST.

Further, the policy focuses

on the vehicle, not the driver.
The

exclusion

under

consideration

by

this

Court

of

Appeals distinguishes between a "temporary substitute automobile"
and an automobile furnished or available for the regular use of
the insured.
5.

THE

PUBLIC

POLICY

BEHIND

THE

EXCLUSION

IS NOT

FOSTERED BY THE ADOPTION OF A "PATTERN OF USE" TEST.
Metropolitan

indicated

to this Court

that the purpose

behind the "drive other cars" exclusion is to encourage (in this
case) an employer to supply sufficient liability insurance on a
company truck being operated by an employee to protect the public
and his employees.

Further, if an individual desires to have

additional, private protection for his operation of the vehicle,
he need only list the vehicle on his individual policy and pay a
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premium for such coverage.

The Court's opinion wouldf in effect,

send a signal to employers
insurance

(since

the

additional

insurance

individual

that

he

that they need not have sufficient

individual's
coverage)
need

not

private

and
pay

sends
for

policy
a

will

signal

insurance

supply
to

coverage

the
on

vehicles he frequently uses but does not own.
6.

THIS COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EXCLUSION, RAISED

BY METROPOLITAN IN ITS BRIEF AND IN ORAL ARGUMENT, WHICH EXCLUDED
A "BUSINESS USE" EXCLUSION.
The Metropolitan policy excluded coverage

(in addition

to the "regular use" exclusion) to vehicles:
. . . while maintained or used by any person
while such person is employed or otherwise
engaged in any other business or occupation. .
.

This Court of Appeals did not discuss the fact that Mr.
Finlayson's use of the truck to take him to and from work each
day was considered by his employer to be part of his business use
of the truck and was part of the normal operation of the truck.
Further, this Court did not discuss the fact that the employer's
business automobile insurance policy has already acknowledged the
injuries sustained were a business-related accident, and has paid
a substantial amount of money for the damages arising from this
accident.
DISCUSSION
POINT I;

THE ISSUES PRESENTED TO THIS COURT OF APPEALS
WERE MANY.
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The issues presented to this Court of Appeals were many
and were complex.

The Court, in addressing the issues before it,

stated:
The single issue on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly determined, on the
stipulated facts, that Finalyson's use of the
FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within
the meaning of the policy.
If it did, the
pickup would not be considered a "non-owned
automobile" for the purposes of the policy and
Metropolitan
would
have
no
liability.
(Opinion p. 2 ) .
The

issue

of

the

use

of

the

pickup

truck

by

Neal

Finlayson was an important issue to this appeal, but was only one
issue.

As Metropolitan

argument, the policy

pointed

excluded

out

in its brief and at oral

coverage

to vehicles which

were

owned by the insured (but not scheduled on the policy), and to
non-owned

vehicles

which

were

furnished

or

available

for

the

regular use of the insured, Mr. Finlayson.
The Court did consider the fact that the
truck was furnished to Neal Finlayson for use
in the course
of his employment,
i.e.,
answering calls for and performing mechanical
repairs, his use of the truck to go to and
from the "Animal House" bar was outside that
course, especially in view of the limitations
expressly put on his use of the truck by
FINCO." (Opinion at p. 3 ) .
However, the Court did not consider nor address the fact
that the truck was available for such use.

The Court's attention

was focused on the actual use to which the vehicle had been put;
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not to the potential

use for which the employer

had made the

truck available.
This distinction

is important.

As a practical matter

using appellant's suggested definition of "regular use," any use
of a non-owned vehicle may be deemed to be "irregular" when an
accident occurs.

The "pattern of use" did not establish that

accidents would regularly occur, that vehicles would be used by
individuals had been drinking, that, etc.

However, the policy

doesn't require only that there be a deviation of actual use in
order to establish an "irregular" use.

Rather, the policy only

requires that the vehicle be available for regular use.
be

that

used."
it

is

a particular

vehicle will

have never

been

It may

"regularly

However, if the potential for regular use exists (i.e.,
"available"

for

regular

use), the

insured must

pay a

premium for coverage or the coverage will be excluded.
Further, the use to which the truck was being put at the
time of the accident was the same as it had been used on numerous
other occasions; i.e., taking Mr. Finlayson home.
Finlayson's

capacity

consumption

of

unaltered.

may

alcohol,

have
but

been
the

diminished
use

of

the

Mr.
because
truck

of

his

remained

The policy exclusion for uses on the potential use of

the truck, not the "state" of the operator.
There

were

a number

of

other

issues,

raised

by

the

parties to the appeal, which were not considered by this Court.
The Court did not

address whether

-7-

Mr. Finlayson's

use of the

pickup truck was a "business use" as excluded in the policy.
The Court
given

its finding

did not address what the effect
of an ambiguity

in the meaning

should be,
of the term

"regular use" as applied against the language of the policy.
The Court did not address the public policy supporting
the "drive other cars" exclusion.
The Court did not address the fact that Mr. Finlayson's
business automobile policy had already acknowledged the accident
to be one covered by its insurance policy.
The Court did not address the internal language of the
exclusion

which

supports

Metropolitan's

contention

of

no

ambiguity.
The point is, there are a number of other issues beyond
simply the issue of whether "Finlayson's use of the FINCO pickup
constituted

'regular

use' within

the meaning

of the policy."

This Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing so that each
of the issues raised can be adequately considered by this Court.
POINT II;

FINDING OF AN AMBIGUITY DOES NOT RESULT, A
FORTIORI, IN COVERAGE.

This Court found that, since the term "regular use" is
ambiguous (because various courts from other jurisdictions have
reached different interpretations of the term) "the phrase must,
therefore, be construed in favor of coverage for Neal Finlayson
and,

therefore,

recovery

for

appellant

holding is not supported by the premise.
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Childs."

The

Court's

This Courtf

citing

Sears v. Riemersmaf

Utah 655 P.2d

1105 (1982) stated that an ambiguity resulting from a failure to
define a term
ambiguous

in a contract

language

in

a

should

contract

"trigger the doctrine that
will

be

strictly

against the party who drafted the provision.

construed

(Opinion p. 5) .

With this general proposition/ Metropolitan does not disagree.
Howeverf the mere finding of an ambiguity does not operate in a
dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity has been found.
This

Court

has

cited

its

own

opinion

Wilburn

v.

Interstate Electric/ C.A. Utah/ 74 Utah Adv.Rep 23 (1988) as
standing for the proposition that:
Ordinarily/
it
is appropriate
to simply
construe ambiguities against insurers/ without
pausing to consider extrinsic evidence as to
intent/ since the parties to routine kinds of
insurance contracts typically do not discuss
or negotiate terms, and provisions.
(Opinion/
p. 3/ footnote 3) .

It should be pointed out that insurance contract forms are not
unilaterally drafted by insurance companies and imposed upon an
unsuspecting public. Under current lawf the insurance industry
is substantially regulated as to the kinds of insurance which may
be written/ the specific provisions which may be contained in
insurance policies/ specific provisions which may not be
contained in insurance policies/ etc. Utah Code Annotated
Section 31A-21-201/ et seq.f provides that insurance policies
must be filed with tHe Commissioner of Insurance who may
disapprove a form for a number of reasons. Specific requirements
for the content and language of insurance policy are also set
forth in detail in many of the Sections of the Insurance Code.
Seef for example. Section 31A-21-301/ et seq. and Chapter 2 2 ,
Contracts in Specific Lines. The definition of a non-owned
vehicle is a definition typically used in insurance policies/
the form of which has been filed with the insurance department.
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Even in cases involving

insurance policies, it is not

dispositive to merely find an ambiguity in an insurance contract.
Even though extrinsic evidence may not be helpful in resolving
questions

of

discussion
required

"intent

may

have

and

meaning"

taken

to determine what

since

place,"
effect

no

further

"negotiation
inquiry

a particular

is

nor
still

definition

may

have on the extent of the exclusion.
Here, for example, the validity of the exclusion was not
questioned.

Rather,

appellant's

alleged ambiguity of the exclusion.

attack

was

focused

on

the

Appellant contended that the

term "regular use" must be interpreted to show a "pattern of use"
consistent

with

a prescribed

course

of

conduct

or dealing

to

which the truck had been put in the past.
Assuming

that

an

ambiguity

exists,

which

the

Court

found, the Court should then determine what effect the exclusion
would

have

when

applying

proposed by appellant.
does not

result

the

definition

of

"regular

use"

as

Merely finding that an ambiguity exists

in dispositive

fashion

to

resolve

the matter

against an insurer.
POINT III:

APPLYING A "PATTERN OF USAGE" MEANING TO THE
TERM "REGULAR USE" DOES NOT ESTABLISH COVERAGE.

As Metropolitan pointed out in its brief and at hearing,
the Metropolitan policy states:
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non-owned automobile" means an automobile
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor
available for the regular use of either the
named insured or any relative, other than a
temporary substitute automobile and includes a
utility
trailer
while
used
with
such
automobile.
Since

the Court

found that the term "regular

use" is

ambiguous, it should apply the meaning proposed by appellant to
the term and then analyze
established

meaning*

the exclusion

Therefore,

the

in light of the then

exclusion

as defined

by

appellant, would read:
"Non-owned automobile" means an automobile
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor
available for the "pattern or prescribed
course of conduct" (i.e., employment use,
answering calls for and performing mechanical
repairs; see Opinion p. 3) of the named
insured . . .
The exclusion does not pertain to a particular use at a
particular time.

Rather, the truck cannot be "furnished for" or

"available for" the "employment use, general course of conduct or
dealing," for which the truck had been used or available.

If it

is, furnished or available for such use, coverage is excluded.
The issue, using the court's adopted definition becomes,
was the truck furnished for the employment use; i.e., "answering
calls for and performing mechanical
the

regular

use of the truck?

repairs"

(Opinion p. 3) as

This Court found

appellant's proposed definition) that it was.

(by adopting

Was the use of the

truck after having left the Animal House contrary to this use?
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Again, the Court apparently found that it was.
However,

was

the

pickup

furnished

"regular use" of Mr. Finlayson.

for

or

(Opinion, p. 3 ) .
available

for

the

Certainly, since the standard

which the Court adopted for the definition of

the term "regular

use" was the use to which the truck was typically used, the truck
was available for regular use.
The particular
constituted

"regular

use at a particular

use"

(using

appellant's

time may not have
and

this Court's

definition) but the pickup truck was obviously furnished for or
available for such use.
This approach is consistent with the cases cited by the
Court in reaching

its decision.

In Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co.

v.DePinto, Kansas 681 P.2d 15 (1984), as cited by the Court, the
Kansas Supreme Court said:
The test whether an automobile is furnished
for
"regular
use" within an exclusionary
clause is not necessarily the frequency or
regularity of its, although an infrequent and
casual use by special permission on particular
occasions may not constitute a furnishing for
regular use. It is the nature of the use for
which the vehicle is intended and to which it
is put, rather than the actual duration of
use, wHich is significant^
(Emphasis Added).
Applying

appellant's

and

the

Court's

definition

of

"regular use" and applying such definition to the facts of this

Again, the use of the pickup truck at the time of the accident
was the same use to which the truck had been put on a number of
occasions; taking Mr. Finlayson home. His capacity to perform
the function was impaired, but the use was the same.
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accident,

the

exclusion

would

still

exclude

coverage

for

the

accident.
POINT IV:

THE POLICY ITSELF ESTABLISHES A FREQUENCY
TEST.
The "regular use" exclusion which is the subject of this

appeal establishes a "frequency test."
exclusion

distinguishes

between

As mentioned above, the

a

"temporary

substitute

automobile" and an automobile which is furnished or available for
the regular use of the named insured.

The exclusion states:

"Non-owned automobile" means an automobile
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor
available for the regular use of either the
named insured or any relative, other than a
temporary substitute automobile. . .
The
"frequency"

policy
standard.

exclusion
That

itself,

then

establishes

a

is, a "temporary" versus "regular"

standard is invoked to determine whether a vehicle is a non-owned
vehicle.

If temporary, the vehicle is a non-owned vehicle.

If

not temporary, the vehicle is a "regular" (i.e., regularly used)
vehicle.
The
rather

than

exclusion
the

of

driver.

the

policy

That

is,

focuses
if

the

on

the

vehicle

automobile

is a

"temporary substitute vehicle" (whether actually used or not), it
is covered by the non-owned definition in the policy.

If the

vehicle is furnished for or available for the regular use of the
insured

(whether

actually

used or not)

automobile as defined in the policy.
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it

is not a non-owned

Here, the truck was used

daily, was stored at Mr. Finlayson's house in the evening (even
though other company trucks were stored at the company lot), Mr.
Finlayson had keys to the truck and Mr. Finlayson was the primary
operator of the truck.

The focus of this court's inquiry should

not be on how the truck was actually usedf but the availability
of the truck for use by Mr. Finlayson.
POINT V:

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE POLICY BEHIND
THE "DRIVE OTHER CARS" PROVISION.
As

pointed

out

in

its

brief,

the

purpose

of

the

provision extending coverage to certain non-owned vehicles, is to
provide

covercige

to

an

insured

while

temporarily

operating

a

non-owned vehicle as a temporary substitute automobile.
In

cases

involving

company

vehicles,

this

policy

encourages employers who allow employees to use company vehicles
to

maintain

adequate

insurance

on

the

company

vehicles

as a

benefit to the employee and as a protection to the public.

In

this case, insurance was maintained by FINCO on the pickup truck
being

used

company

by

truck

Mr.

Finlayson.

has

already

paid

The

automobile

almost

two

policy

hundred

on

the

thousand

dollars in claims arising from this accident.
However, if an employee uses a truck on a regular basis
as more

than

a temporary

substitute

vehicle and

is concerned

about the limits of insurance being maintained by his company, or
is concerned that his company may disclaim any responsibility for
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his acts, he may obtain his own coverage by simply listing the
truck on his policy and paying a premium for such coverage.
Here, Mr. Finlayson only listed the Chevrolet Monte Carlo on the
insurance policy with Metropolitan.

He did not ask for, nor did

he pay a premium for, insurance on the pickup truck.

Yet, this

truck was used by Mr. Finlayson as the primary operator.

Since

he used it every day in his work, used it to go to and from work,
used it some evenings, and used it on some occasions for personal
errands,

he

operated.

used

the

truck

more

than

any

other

vehicle

he

The truck was actually used, and available for, use

beyond a temporary substitute vehicle.
Sound public policy

supports a finding

that only the

FINCO business automobile policy would apply to the accident.
POINT VI;

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE BUSINESS USE
EXCLUSION.

As

mentioned

in

Metropolitan's

brief,

the

policy

of

insurance excluded coverage to:
. . . a non-owned automobile while maintained
or used by any person while such person is
employed or otherwise engaged in any other
business or occupation. . .
Neal's employer considered his use of the truck to take
him

to his job and back home from the job to be part of the

authorized business use.
time

of

the

accident,

(See Stipulated Facts, #19).

Neal

Finlayson

was

At the

on his way home.

(Stipulated Facts, #26). The 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck was
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stored at Neal Finlayson's home in the evenings, although other
company trucks were stored at the company lot when not in use,
(Stipulated Facts, #17).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing

reasons, and each of them, it is

respectfully submitted that this Court of Appeals should grant
Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing in order to fully consider the
facts, issues and law applicable to this case.
DATED this

£X*f

day of March, 1988.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

7ELL V. SMITH
Attorneys for Metropolitan
Property & Liability
Insurance Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailedf postage
prepaid, on this

cPjL day of March, 1988, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the following:
Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735 Judge Buildng
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84111
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
John M. Chipman
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84101
Attorney for Neal Finlayson (not a
party in the appeal)
Lynn J. Clark
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108
Midvale, UT 84047
Attorney for Mike Barton (not a party
in the appeal)
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